

1 June 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence**SUBJECT: Agreed Activities**

1. The following basic assumptions underly the attached approach (Tab A) to the agreed activities problem:

a. A DCID is a proper and preferred instrument for working out the "agreed activities" problem and is binding on the clandestine collection organizations of the armed forces. *

b. We should continue to deal with the chiefs of military intelligence on this matter until they inform the DCI that they are not the competent authorities.

OSD HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.

***NSCID-1, Para. 3c. "The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the National Security Council to insure full and proper implementation of the Council directives by issuing such supplementary DCI directives as may be required. Such implementing directives in which the Intelligence Advisory Committee concur unanimously shall be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall be implemented within the departments and agencies as provided in paragraph b. Where disagreement arises between the Director of Central Intelligence and one or more members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee over such directives, the proposed directive, together with statements of non-concurrence, shall be forwarded to the NSC for decision as provided in paragraph a."**

NSCID-1, Para. 3b. "Recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, when approved by the National Security Council, issue as Council Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence. The respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders or directives, when applicable, are implemented within their intelligence organizations."

c. There is a functional need for clandestine intelligence operations by the armed forces. Therefore, our effort should not be to eliminate such operations but rather to properly relate them to the DCI, who has primary responsibility in this field--a common concern responsibility--which must not only be responsive to the military agencies but also to other agencies and to the NSC.

(It may be that after a period of working together under this assumption and within the framework of the proposed DCID, all parties may come to feel that a single U. S. clandestine collection organization is the best answer.)

d. Our objective should be to develop a mechanism, a device, or a procedure which will (a) permit the development of CIA leadership; (b) encourage the identification of specific problems so that they can be ironed out on their merits (rather than by expecting that we can resolve them promptly by calling on theories or principles of authority even though these may properly apply and eventually be acceptable); (c) permit referral in a predictable and systematic manner to such higher authority as the seriousness of the given problem requires; and (d) always retain the initiative for the DCI to move the problem to a new level.

2. Keeping the foregoing in mind, it is also useful to take stock of what has been achieved to date through the IPC. Its charter (at Tab B, from IAC-D-28/1)¹ has been exploited rather fully, except with regard to paragraph 1b, last clause, "...diversion or concentration of clandestine collection capabilities." It should be noted that the tone of this charter, except for paragraph 1c, is such as to be inclusive of the clandestine intelligence operations of the entire government, while at the same time recognizing the "primary responsibility" of CIA in this field (paragraph 6).

3. The IPC has also brought about these developments, in addition to establishing agreed priority targets for FI:

a. IPC has coordinated overt and covert intelligence

* No Tab B
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requirements through insuring that targets placed upon or accepted by FI cannot be satisfied by overt collection (para. 3 of NSCID-5).

to a degree
b. IPC has insured that FI and the military would not be going after the same targets because:

(1) the military were requested not to make requests where they had a covert capability (as well as overt capability).

(2) the military have withdrawn a target when through their own covert capability a requirement has been satisfied.

c. FI has briefed the IPC on FI plans and capabilities to some degree and within security limits.

d. The military have been requested but have not seen fit to reciprocate by stating their plans and capabilities.

4. The attached draft DCID 5/1 is presented, in so far as possible, so that the areas of agreement or disagreement between CIA and JIC drafts are discernible, thus:

a. The preamble shows various versions. (I find the CIA May, 1953 version most explicit. I think the fourth version (OIC) is adequate and from studying the various drafts believe it would be acceptable to the military.)

b. With regard to alternative paragraph 1, I find the CIA May, 1953 draft most explicit and preferable. However, I do not detect anything objectionable in the JIC April, 1954 version. There may be some virtue in changing "may" to "will" but I do not think this essential, in view of the committee terms of reference.

c. The terms of reference for the clandestine committee borrow in the opening sentence from paragraph 2

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of the JIC draft and IAC-D-28/1; the remainder of paragraph 2 of the Draft DCID and paragraph 3 borrow from IAC-D-28/1, CIA May, 1953 draft, and JIC April, 1954 draft, and a draft produced in DDP.

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Draft DCID-5/1

Alternate Preamble⁸

CIA
May 1953
In order to promote the most effective use of all espionage capabilities currently or potentially available to the U. S. Government and to supplement those *clandestine intelligence (collection)* operations which are *(sic)* ~~primarily~~ the responsibility of the DCI and to establish the conditions under which the intelligence agencies of the military services may conduct espionage operations as "agreed activities" under the provisions of NSCID-5, paragraph No. 1:

JIC
April 1954
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purpose of clarifying NSCID-5, by defining the terms of reference under which the armed services may conduct clandestine intelligence operations in order to strengthen the over-all national intelligence collection capability:

OIC
June 1954
Pursuant to and in clarification of the provisions of NSCID-5, *and define to agreed activities* and for the purpose of strengthening the over-all national clandestine collection capability:

OIC
June 1954
Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID-5, *and define to agreed activities* and for the purposes of coordinating and strengthening the over-all national clandestine capability: *to mean selection of them before the DCI.*

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Alternate Paragraphs 1

CIA

May 1953

Where United States combat commands are located outside the continental limits of the U.S. for the purpose of carrying out missions assigned to them by the JCS or other competent authority, the commanders thereof may ~~(will)~~ conduct *clandestine intelligence or espionage operations* essential to the execution of *(collection)* their assigned missions and for such other purposes as are mutually agreed to be in the National interest by the DCI and the Service intelligence chief(s) primarily concerned, *(provided that:)*

JIC

April 1954

The armed services of the U.S. may ~~(will)~~ conduct clandestine intelligence operations necessary to fulfill their intelligence requirements for the accomplishment of their assigned missions and to support the operational and security requirements of their forces and elements overseas.

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CIA No. 36345-a

2. In order to insure coordination of such clandestine intelligence operations of the armed services with those espionage operations which are the responsibility of the DCI, there is hereby established a subcommittee of the IAC which will be called the Clandestine Collection Committee (CCC) and which will perform the following functions in connection with the clandestine collection of foreign information outside the U. S. and possessions, and related problems:

a. To determine, in accordance with the National Intelligence Objectives as established by the IAC, those foreign information requirements of the U. S. Government which require collection by clandestine means.

b. To maintain (1) a current listing of those requirements which the armed services clandestine operations ~~can be reasonably expected to satisfy~~ *and for which they will* ~~accept responsibility for~~ and (2) a current listing of those requirements which are deemed to have a priority status in terms of the overall interests of the U. S. Government and which CIA has the current capability to satisfy ~~and~~ *should* prepare long range plans to satisfy. To accomplish this the committee shall develop procedures for the systematic review of basic plans for clandestine collection ~~of information of interest to the armed services~~ *of the member agencies*. Such

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basic plans will outline the type of espionage operation contemplated, indicate the specific missions to be supported, and define the geographic boundaries of the area in which it will be conducted, and will be sufficiently comprehensive and long range in nature to preclude the necessity for continuing detailed coordination at the Washington level after they have been duly authorized.

c. To refer to the IAC for resolution conflicts between the plans of the military services and those of the DCI which cannot be adjusted by agreement of the members.

d. To resolve (and, failing that, to refer to the IAC) conflicts arising from field coordination (see below paragraph 3).

3. In order to assure coordination in the field of the clandestine collection operations of the military services with those of CIA, the senior military representative and the senior representative of the DCI will review together their detailed operational plans. These officers will refer through appropriate channels for resolution by the CCC conflicts between such plans which cannot be adjusted by agreement of the parties. In the event that time does not permit referral of an issue to Headquarters in Washington, the operation may proceed pending resolution in Washington.